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South Africa’s Constitution protects the fundamental rights of all citizens, includ-
ing children. The recent Children’s Act and the Children’s Amendment Act crimi-
nalise corporal punishment of children by their parents. This article endeavours to 
describe the dilemma between corporal punishment and human rights in South 
Africa. It investigates possible democratic approaches to resolving the dilemma and 
offers deliberative democracy as a possible way to guide discussions on this di-
lemma. The article evaluates the applicability of deliberative democracy to the 
case of corporal punishment and human rights and highlights the need to consider 
alternative strategies to discipline children.
Riglyne ter oplossing van die dilemma van lyfstraf  
teenoor menseregte in Suid-Afrika
Suid-Afrika se Grondwet beskerm die fundamentele regte van alle burgers, in-
sluitende kinders. Die nuwe Kinderwet en die Kinder Wysigingswet kriminaliseer 
lyfstraf van kinders deur hul ouers. Hierde artikel poog om die dilemma tussen 
lyfstraf en menseregte in Suid-Afrika te beskryf. Moontlike demokratiese benade-
rings ter oplossing van die dilemma word ondersoek en oorlegplegende demokrasie 
word voorgestel as ’n moontlike wyse om gesprekke oor die dilemma te rig. Die 
toepassingsmoontlikhede van oorlegplegende demokrasie, in die geval van lyfstraf 
en mensregte, word verder geëvalueer en die behoefte om alternatiewe strategieë te 
oorweeg om kinders te dissiplineer beklemtoon.
Prof G Pretorius, Centre for Psychological Services and Career Development, Uni-








Pretorius/Corporal punishment and human rights
It is the duty of parents to raise their children to become respon-sible and well-adjusted young people. McWhirter et al (2004: 4) argue that the well-being of society depends on how well parents 
perform this duty. A family usually consisting of parents and children 
is considered to be the backbone of society. The relationship between 
parents and children is one of the most important relationships in 
society. According to Golombok (2003: 63), children’s emotional and 
interpersonal well-being depends, to some extent, on the quality of 
the relationships between them and their parents. Parenting styles 
can therefore play a large role in promoting psychological adjust-
ment or causing psychological problems in children. Children’s 
well-being, however, also depends on the characteristics of the child 
(Golombok 2003: 98), the way in which these two factors influence 
each other, and the wider social world in which families live. 
Taking the above into account and considering the responsibility 
of parents to appropriately nurture and discipline their children, it is 
not surprising that parents often need guidance in this challenging 
endeavour. The literature on parenting is filled with debates about 
the implications of corporal punishment on children (Bender et al 
2007: 227). In addition to Section 28 of the South African Consti-
tution (which protects the rights of South African children), South 
Africa also has a Children’s Act (No 38 of 2005) and a Children’s 
Amendment Act (No 41 of 2007). Although these Acts have already 
been promulgated, the sections on corporal punishment of children 
by their parents must still be implemented in practice. According 
to Article 139 of the Children’s Amendment Bill, a physical hiding 
by a parent is tantamount to assault.
Should this amendment be accepted, corporal punishment of chil-
dren by their parents will be considered a crime. The Children’s Act 
and its amendment thus have serious implications for the rights of 
parents and children, and consequently pose an ethical dilemma. The 
Bill is highly controversial because various political parties and other 
groupings claim that it interferes with parents’ rights and competen-
cies to punish their children (cf SAPA 2007 & 2008). On the contrary, 
other stakeholders who argue from a human rights point of view main-
tain that it is the right of a child to be protected against physical injury 
244
Acta Academica 2010 42(1)
and harm1 In order to review the Children’s Act, the government pu-
blished the revised Act in the Government Gazette and requested com-
ments and input from the public. This procedure has, however, been 
criticised for lack of discussion (cf Waterhouse 2007: 1-3). 
1. Legalising corporal punishment of children
The Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary (Wehmeier et al 2005: 206) 
defines corporal punishment as “the physical punishment of people, 
especially by hitting them”. This article adopts the legal definition 
of children as people between the ages of birth and eighteen, as indi-
cated in the Children’s Act. This article focuses on the legal processes 
of decision-making in order to determine whether corporal punish-
ment of children by their parents should be addressed by law or not. 
In order to manage the complex topic of ethical dilemmas in corpo-
ral punishment, this article does not cover corporal punishment by 
teachers and other adults in authority over children. 
According to the Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy (Craig 2006: 
867), democracy means “rule by the people”. This implies a system 
in which decisions are made on the basis of everyone participating 
in decision-making processes. The challenges that majority rule and 
equal opinions pose to democracy can, according to this encyclo-
paedia, be met by means of a model according to which unanimous 
decisions are reached through a process of discussion that upholds 
respect for equal autonomy and the participation of all. Based on the 
above, this article uses the term “democracy” to refer to democratic 
principles that include a process of discussion and the simultaneous 
upholding of the values of freedom (liberty) and equality.
In analysing the problem of legislating what should be allowed 
in the relationship between parent and child, some tension is evident 
between the democratic values of freedom and equality. According 
to Ebenstein & Fogelman (1990: 169), negative freedom implies 
that a person should be “free from” negative influences, and positive 
freedom implies that a person should be “able to” achieve positive 
development. This is the dilemma of corporal punishment: while 
1 Cf <http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org>
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children should be free from bodily harm, parents should simul-
taneously be free to raise their children without interference from 
government. The fact that children and adults are not equal in cog-
nitive development, experience and basic life competencies further 
complicates the issue. Parents are in a position of power over their 
children and therefore have an obligation to raise them to become 
moral, law-abiding citizens, while at the same time children have the 
right to appropriate socialisation and education.
When the revision of the Children’s Act is placed within the con-
text of democracy, Gould’s (2002: 7) question as to “who may be said 
to have a right to participate and to what degree?” becomes relevant. 
My argument coincides with that of Gould (2002: 17): “those en-
gaged in a common activity defined by shared goals, have a right to 
co-determine decisions as an expression of their status as free and 
equal beings”. What should happen in a democracy regarding cor-
poral punishment if children are not free or equal to parents and 
legislation? Before attempting to answer this question it should be 
noted that I concur with rational empiricists in that we have never 
arrived and will never arrive at final answers, and that truth is always 
tentative, changing and subject to constant checking and verifica-
tion (Ebenstein & Fogelman 1990: 170).
In an endeavour to answer the above question, it should be noted 
that John Stuart Mill, when referring to liberty, states: “Over him-
self, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Gut-
mann & Thompson 1996: 230). This statement is simple and true, 
until Mill defines the “scope of liberty” as follows: “The only part of 
the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 233). The 
conduct of parents in raising their children certainly concerns their 
children now and in the future. It follows that parents are account-
able to society and their children, in particular, for their conduct in 
performing their parental duties.
As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of society includes the 
family in one form or another (Rawls 2003: 10). Nobody will contest 
the fact that currently families take on many different forms. Orton 
(1997: 11) describes in detail how families have changed over the past 
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fifty years. She quotes Roberts’ research findings that three quarters 
of American respondents chose “a group of people” as the preferred 
definition of a family (Orton 1997: 11). 
Although parenting styles vary and are influenced by culture, re-
ligion and personality (cf Muzi 2000: 3-428), Langdren (2005: 226) 
argues that strengthening a protective environment for children - in 
which parents can optimise their duty towards their children – “re-
quires many levels of engagement, including dialogue and partner-
ships between parents and children”. It could therefore be argued 
that the process of deliberating the issue as to whether or not people 
should be allowed to punish their children – by means of corporal 
punishment – is crucial. Because children are vulnerable members 
of society and, according to Rawls (2003: 57), the least advantaged, 
they should be represented in this decision-making process by adults 
who care for and protect them. 
2. Democratic approaches to resolving the dilemma
Since 1994 South Africa has been a democratic country, governed by 
the principles of the theory of democracy. The theory of democracy 
as a whole, according to Dryzek (2002: iii), made a deliberate shift 
in 1990. Prior to this, devices such as voting and representation 
were used to aggregate an individual’s preferences or interests in 
collective decisions in politics. According to Miller (2003: 182), the 
institutions of free elections, competing political parties and free-
dom of speech underlie the conception of democracy, and this may 
be referred to as “liberal democracy”. The aim of liberal democracy 
was to aggregate individual preferences into a collective choice by 
implementing these underlying institutions (such as voting) and by 
giving each person’s preferences equal weight (Miller 2003: 183). 
Thus, in liberal democracy, majority preferences guided decisions. 
Dryzek (2002: iii) states that in deliberative democracy, how-
ever, “the essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought instead 
in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to 
engage in authentic deliberation about the decision”. In delibera-
tive democracy the premise that there will be conflicts in political 
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preferences between people is the starting point of the theory. The 
purpose of democratic institutions should then be to resolve these 
conflicts. According to Miller (2003: 183), deliberative democracy 
envisages the resolution of conflicts between people “through an 
open and uncoerced discussion of the issue[s] at stake with the aim 
of arriving at an agreed judgement”.
In addition to liberal democracy and deliberative democracy, 
Young (2003: 102) adds activism as a third major tier of contempo-
rary democratic theory. The activist approach, according to Young 
(2003: 103), engages primarily in critical oppositional activity, 
rather than attempting to reach agreement with those supporting or 
benefiting from existing power struggles. She argues that activism 
should form an integral part of any democracy and should encourage 
and include demonstrations, street marches, sit-ins, musical works 
and cartoons that oppose and challenge political decisions. The ac-
tivist approach ensures deliberation, according to Young (2003: 104), 
especially with people in power as they are seen to represent the 
institutions that perpetuate harm or injustices. 
Lester (2006: 352) argues that all exercises of authority over in-
dividuals in a democracy should be justified. Democracy should not 
have authority over people but people should be actively involved in 
decision-making. Therefore if a government wants to take control of, 
for example, how people raise their children, this should be justified. 
In the South African context this principle has important implications 
for the legitimate extent of parents’ authority over their children’s 
upbringing, as well as for the rights of children. In evaluating an ap-
proach to the decision of legalising parental corporate punishment, I 
argue that the three tiers of democratic theory, namely liberal demo-
cracy, deliberative democracy and activism should be compared. 
If activism is the preferred choice to approach the corporal pun-
ishment dilemma, people opposing and criticising the legalisation 
of parental practices will refuse to take part in discussions about the 
matter. They will actively oppose it by means of demonstrations, 
street marches, and other activist means (Young 2003: 118). If li-
beral democracy should be chosen as the approach to resolving the 
dilemma, people will all have equal rights, and they will accordingly 
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vote on whether parental practices should be legalised; the majority 
of votes then becomes the final decision (Miller 2001: 184). If delib-
erative democracy is applied as the means to resolve the dilemma, 
people will embark on a process of discussions on the corporal pun-
ishment issue with the aim of reaching an agreed outcome among all 
stakeholders. This judgement will take into account the views of all 
participants (Miller 2003: 184). 
Although children may be implicitly represented in an activist 
approach, and some adults in a liberal democratic approach may vote 
with the best interest of children in mind, children’s rights cannot 
be explicitly represented by these two approaches. In a deliberative 
democratic approach, however, children (and parents) will be expli-
citly stated as major stakeholders in the decision as to whether cor-
poral punishment of children by their parents should be legalised. 
For this reason, I argue that deliberative democracy should be the 
approach of choice in an attempt to resolve the dilemma. 
3. Deliberative democracy
Before discussing the concept of deliberative democracy, it is necessary 
to define it. Chappel (2006: 2) defines deliberative democracy as a “poli-
tical process in which decisions are arrived at through open and inclusive 
dialogue rather than a mere aggregation of votes”. Since the deliberative 
turn in democratic theory, extensive literature about the construct arose 
and many authors wrote on the theory (Dryzek 2002: 49). 
Gutmann & Thompson (2003: 31) state that theories of delib-
erative democracy consist of a set of principles which are intended to 
establish fair terms for guiding political cooperation in a democratic 
society. Dryzek (2002: iii) prefers the term “discursive democracy” to 
“deliberative democracy”, motivating his preference by arguing that 
deliberation can be a personal decision process and not necessarily a 
collective social process. He further argues that the term “discursive” 
is more expansive in the type of communication it allows, and that 
“deliberation” has connotations of calm, reasoned argument. Discus-
sions about issues of morality are, however, seldom calm and reasoned. 
Despite this motivation he admits that the two terms (“deliberation” 
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and “discursive”) are used interchangeably as they both refer to the 
same set of core democratic principles (Dryzek 2002: iv). 
Irrespective of what the theory is called, Dryzek (2002: 175) pos-
tulates that it promises a renewed focus on the authenticity of democ-
racy which strengthened it. Walsh (2007: 2) welcomes this, arguing 
that all those affected by a common concern should be included in 
equitable processes of decision-making and self-government. Ac-
cording to her, deliberative theorists and the means whereby they 
want to strengthen democracy differ. However, they all want to in-
vigorate democracy by means of deliberative ways of overcoming 
the limitations of liberal democracy by offering discussions as ways 
to transform it. Elstub (2006: 301) argues that democratic theory 
has evolved to such an extent that it has made deliberative theory 
relevant for use in moral decision-making. According to him, the 
general core of deliberate democracy revolves around the making 
of collective decisions. It therefore involves the participation of all 
relevant actors (the more equal, the more democratic), the consi-
deration and exchange of reasons for points of view, and it should be 
aimed at transforming preferences (Elstub 2006: 303). 
The theory of deliberative democracy developed by Gutmann & 
Thompson (1996) is a good example of incorporating all the ideals and 
general core values of the conception of deliberative democracy (Dryzek 
2002: 16-7). For this reason this article will adopt the theory of Gut-
mann & Thompson (1996, 2003) as it represents the position of deliber-
ative democrats, and will be applied as a set of guidelines for deliberation 
about the dilemma of parental corporal punishment in South Africa.
According to Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 1), deliberative de-
mocracy “secures a central place for moral discussion in political 
life”. The core principle (including all stakeholders in these discus-
sions) necessitates the identification of all these stakeholders, in-
cluding children (or their representatives), parents and institutions 
involved in the care and protection of children, in a discussion about 
corporal punishment. The role and responsibilities of parents as pri-
mary caretakers of children should be recognised, and they should 
therefore be accorded the main competence in raising their children. 
Considering the parental practices embedded in various cultural, 
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religious and personal differences in South Africa, it can be expected 
that conflict and disagreement will exist. Dryzek (2002: 175) ad-
vises that in such instances discussions between the stakeholders 
should occur across boundaries and between humanity. 
In this deliberative process (as applied in the case of parental 
corporal punishment in South Africa) the conditions for deliberation 
may be defined, according to Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 55), as 
reciprocity, publicity and accountability. According to them, reci-
procity “in this instance means the active seeking of fair terms of 
co-operation and mutually acceptable ways to resolve disagreement. 
This should be done in a spirit of mutual respect and accommo-
dation” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 55). In other words, even 
if welfare, education, human rights activists, parents and children 
disagree, this disagreement should be discussed in a spirit of mag-
nanimity and respect. 
In my opinion, the debate on corporal punishment should be 
conducted openly and in public with appropriate publicity. Gutmann 
& Thompson (1996: 97) state that “modern democracies have found 
that publicity can be a powerful sanction”. According to them, pu-
blicity has the advantage that it forces stakeholders to focus on risks 
and benefits. Referring to accountability, they state “in a deliberative 
forum, each is accountable to all” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 128). 
It is also important to note that the way in which people understand 
liberty and opportunity influences the way in which they interpret 
and apply reciprocity, publicity and accountability (Gutmann & 
Thompson 1996: 349).
Now that the conditions for the deliberative process have been 
defined, the importance of opportunity in this case cannot be down-
played. Each and every child and parent in South Africa should “have a 
chance to have a chance” in the corporal punishment debate (Gutmann 
& Thompson 1996: 208). The sad fact is that there are neither basic nor 
fair opportunities for children in South Africa. However, according to 
the Children’s Act and the Children’s Rights, children should have a 
voice. Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 349) state in this regard:
No matter how earnestly citizens carry on deliberation in the spirit of 
reciprocity, publicity and accountability, they can realize these ideals 
251
Pretorius/Corporal punishment and human rights
only to the extent that each citizen has sufficient social and economic 
standing to meet his or her fellows in terms of equal support.
Therefore, even though there is a lack of equality and opportu-
nity, and one realisee the injustice of this inequality, these factors 
should not prevent South African society from deliberating on the 
issue. It could, on the contrary, be a motivating factor to encourage 
the development of a more deliberate form of democracy. This is in 
line with Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 357):
Any adequate opportunity principle, whatever it may require now, 
should encourage government to find ways in the future to avoid 
denying opportunity to the opposite level.
It may be argued that the civil, public and private liberties of 
parents and children can be protected and enhanced by the process 
of deliberative democracy. Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 230) re-
ject the position of moralists and paternalists regarding liberty and 
instead embrace “maintaining the priority of basic liberty”. Basic 
liberty, according to them protects physical and mental integrity 
as a precondition for other liberties (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 
237). Every child can therefore rightly ask for a chance to have a life 
free from corporal punishment, and similarly every parent a chance 
to raise their children free from government interference. In revising 
the Children’s Act, it becomes essential to decide whose basic integ-
rity is more important. Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 294) support 
the egalitarian view that “the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society” should be ensured by deliberative democracy. 
The Rawlsian rationale for protecting specific liberties such as 
those of children is based on a consideration of “which liberties are 
essential social conditions for the adequate development of moral 
personality over a complete life” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 211). 
Gutmann & Thompson (1996: 213) further encourage demo cracies 
in the face of competing values to decide “who counts as the least 
advantaged, and justify the maximization of their life chances”. If 
all the above is considered carefully, and if the South African govern-
ment wishes to protect the basic liberty of children, it is clear that 
the revision of the Act was justified.
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In addressing parents’ liberty to raise their children free from 
government interference, it appears that by telling parents that they 
are not allowed to physically punish their children, no basic physical 
or mental integrity of the parent is violated. Rather, parents are now 
encouraged to find more constructive ways to discipline their chil-
dren. Deliberation that serves liberty and opportunity results in new 
and more constructive ways to teach children respect, fairness and 
the democratic values of equality, liberty and opportunity. It follows 
that education at home and parents leading by example may result 
in the reward of children growing up to be moral citizens.
The concern, however, is that many parents in South Africa do 
not necessarily have the requisite knowledge of alternative discipli-
nary skills. It could therefore be argued that, in conjunction with 
the implementation of this Act, the government and social services 
should launch a campaign of training and support targeted at par-
ents. Such a strategy could be reinforced if the education system 
and religious institutions provide a context in which children and 
families can practise their morality. It is hoped that the process of 
deliberation will be shaped by moral discussion that is justified in 
terms of the principles of accountability, participation and publicity. 
It is further hoped that the moral discussion will make provision for 
the diversity of participants in terms of religion, culture, and race, 
and that it will specify and apply new ways, identify issues and set 
priorities, and identify a range of options that lead to the provisional 
resolution of issues (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 199-229). This 
will provide an opportunity for parents and children to embrace 
alternative ways of discipline and for parents to develop a variety of 
parenting skills. Their liberties and opportunities will thus simul-
taneously be protected and enhanced. It can be reiterated that the 
means becomes the end and it appears that the end also becomes the 
means, as the process is incomplete and continues under the constant 
influence of the principles of deliberative democracy. 
The question remains as to whether deliberative democracy as a 
way to resolve the dilemma of corporal punishment and the rights of 
parents and children will be effective. 
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4. A critical evaluation of deliberative democracy
In critical analyses of deliberative democracy both Walsh (2007: 2) and 
Holsten (2007: 3) argue that the theoretical approach is too abstract, 
static and universal. In addition, Young (2003: 118) proposes that 
deliberative democracy is not sufficiently critical and that it should 
expose exclusions and constraints in the “supposedly fair” processes in 
actual decision-making. She maintains that deliberative procedures 
are exclusive and that formal inclusion is usually not sufficient to gua-
rantee representation of all major stakeholders (Young 2003: 108-9). 
According to some critics, deliberative democracy has limita-
tions in democracies such as South Africa where structural inequali-
ties exist (Holsten 2007: 29, Young 2003: 102-3). In the context of 
the diversity and structural inequalities in South Africa, the criti-
cism of Holsten (2007: 29) that the theory of Gutmann and Thomp-
son relies too heavily on the proliferation of deliberative forums 
seems appropriate. According to him, the scarcity of resources, the 
incompatibi lity of certain values, the limited generosity and the in-
adequate understanding of particular disagreements are exacerbated 
as sources of moral conflict (Holsten 2007: 30). Holsten (2007: 29) 
warns that, although forthrightness, magnanimity, broad-minded-
ness and willingness to cooperate are potential outcomes of delib-
erative forums, they are not necessarily the consequences of human 
interaction over moral conflicts. It follows that, even if stakeholders 
enter into deliberation about corporal punishment in South Africa, 
the outcome may not be what was envisaged at the outset. 
Elstub (2006: 301) also warns that deliberative democracy should 
not become everything to everyone and lose its core set of ideas and 
essence. The most relevant criticism that should be taken cognisance 
of in the South African context, however, is Holsten’s (2007: 31) 
argument that if decisions are not tied to political realities, they are 
often insensitive to the historical circumstances and contingencies 
of political contexts. He thus argues that in relying on institutions 
to promote civility and mutual respect, the cultural preconditions 
of behaviour are often ignored. 
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Despite the argument for deliberative democracy, Krupnikov et 
al (2007: 2-19), in a study on the psychological plausibility of deli-
berative democracy, investigated the effects of information process-
ing on race, gender and bias in deliberative processes. Their findings 
portray a bleak picture in terms of the motivation of people to tran-
scend individual and cultural differences in deliberative processes. 
They therefore propose that, for deliberative democracy to work, 
individuals will have to become more involved and overcome their 
biases (Krupnikov et al 2007). This could be a potential barrier in 
the context of South Africa.
Considering the above criticisms, it appears that in the South 
African context, deliberative democracy in the case of corporal pu-
nishment and human rights will only be plausible if the theory can be 
applied in a practical and critical manner. In addition, the inclusion 
of all relevant stakeholders from a variety of religious, racial, cultural 
and historic backgrounds must be guaranteed, while sensitivity for 
cultural and historical differences must be maintained. Finally, in-
dividuals should be encouraged to take part and be involved in the 
decision-making process and transcend their own personal biases. 
5. Alternative strategies to discipline children
If corporal punishment of children by their parents becomes a cri-
minal offence, it follows that family and its private internal sphere 
becomes public domain. Hale (2006: 355) refers to the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, which states that “the child is not the 
child of the state” and that “the child is [also] not just the child of the 
family”. In South Africa, according to the Children’s Act, the High 
Court is the upper guardian of the child. When the family disregards 
and disrespects the rights of the child, the state has an obligation to 
protect the child. When, for instance, the bodily integrity of a child 
is violated, criminal legal action should follow. 
With the practical implementation of this Act, many parents will 
need guidance pertaining to constructive alternatives to corporal 
punishment. Parents should be encouraged and assisted to strengthen 
the relationships between themselves and their children (Golombok 
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2003: 63-74). Effective communication and non-violent disciplinary 
strategies as well as building coping skills should also be included 
in parental training (Christopherson & Martweet 2003: 45-99). It 
is hoped that these conditions will protect the rights of the parent 
and the child in discipline. Parental emotional well-being has been 
found to be associated with discipline practices (Regalado et al 2004: 
1956), as well as genetic and environmental factors (Knafo & Plomin 
2006: 148). It follows that parental well-being and environmental 
factors (such as poverty and other psychosocial political factors) will 
also need to be addressed in a training campaign for South African 
parents if this endeavour is to succeed.
6. Conclusion
This article discussed the dilemma of legislating parental disciplinary 
practices in the context of human rights in South Africa. Possible ap-
proaches for resolving the dilemma were investigated and deliberate 
democracy was proposed as a possible means of guiding discussions 
on corporal punishment and human rights. Deliberative democracy 
was critically evaluated and considerations for alternative strategies 
to discipline children were proposed. 
In reflecting on the above, it appears that legislating what should 
occur between parent and child in South Africa is necessary, and will 
also take considerable effort from all stakeholders. It is hoped that 
participants who come from various moral, religious, racial and cul-
tural backgrounds to engage in the deliberative processes will be 
able to reach agreement about corporal punishment that contributes 
to respect for and sensitivity toward different religious and cultural 
beliefs. It is also hoped that the rights of parents and children in 
South Africa will be protected in both the private and public domains 
of family life.
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